The Politics of Negotiating EU Readmission Agreements: Insights from Morocco and Turkey by Wolff, S
















Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
However, 
this readmission obligation does not apply to third country nationals or 
stateless persons. Article 13  only provides that these two categories of persons 
can be included "if deemed necessary by  any of the parties" in a future agreement. 
This clause does not specify whether this agreement should be concluded 
with the EC  or bilaterally with each Member States;92  for the moment, no EC 
 readmission agreement has been concluded with ACP  Countries. A  mandate for 
Cape Verde is however being discussed	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The	  subject	  of	  this	  article	  is	  the	  politics	  of	  instrumentation	  of	  EU	  Readmission	  Agreement	  (EURA)	  
negotiations	  with	  Morocco	  and	  Turkey.	  Refusing	   to	  sign	  an	  EURA	   for	  more	   than	   ten	  years,	   they	  
share	   a	   similar	   position	   of	   ‘hard	   bargainers’.	   Recently	   though	   a	   ‘negotiation	   turn’	   took	   place,	  
Turkey	   initialling	   an	   EURA	   in	   June	   2012	   and	   Morocco	   committing	   to	   sign	   an	   EURA	   within	   the	  
framework	  of	  a	  Mobility	  Partnership	  (MP)	  in	  June	  2013.	  
	  
Unpacking	   the	   role	   of	   EU	   incentives	   and	   third	   countries’	   preferences,	   this	   article	   reveals	   that	  
beyond	   the	   function	   of	   this	   instrument	   to	   co-­‐opt	   third	   countries	   in	   EU’s	   fight	   against	   irregular	  
migration,	   a	   series	   of	   obstacles	   forced	   the	   EU	   to	   revise	   the	   design	   of	   EURA	   and	   to	   take	   into	  
account	   domestic	   and	   regional	   factors.	   	   This	   article	   engages	   with	   the	   meanings	   and	  
representations	  carried	  by	  EURAs	  in	  third	  countries	  and	  implications	  for	  the	  logic	  of	  consequences	  
and	  appropriateness	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  EU	  external	  migration	  policy.	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Introduction1	  	  
	  
This	   article	   analyses	   the	   politics	   of	   instrumentation	   of	   EU	  Readmission	  Agreement	   (EURA)	  
from	  a	  third	  country	  perspective.	  The	  role	  of	  EU	  incentives	  and	  third	  countries’	  preferences	  
in	  the	  negotiations	  of	  this	  policy	  instrument	  originally	  designed	  as	  ‘new	  policy	  instruments	  in	  
the	  construction	  of	  rational	  and	  orderly	  immigration	  regimes’2	  are	  scrutinised.	  Through	  the	  
case	   studies	   of	   Morocco	   and	   Turkey,	   it	   evidenced	   that	   policy	   instruments	   are	   inherently	  
political	  and	  cannot	  be	  neutral	  devices.	  Refusing	  to	  sign	  an	  EURA	  for	  more	  than	  ten	  years,	  
both	  countries	  share	  a	  similar	  position	  of	   ‘hard	  bargainers’.	  Recently	  though	  a	   ‘negotiation	  
turn’	  took	  place,	  Turkey	  initialling	  an	  EURA	  in	  June	  2012	  and	  Morocco	  committing	  to	  sign	  an	  
EURA	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  Mobility	  Partnership	  (MP)	  in	  June	  2013.	  	  
	  
With	   this	   research	   puzzle	   in	   mind,	   this	   article	   shows	   that	   beyond	   the	   functional	   need	   of	  
EURAs	  to	  co-­‐opt	  third	  countries	  in	  EU’s	  fight	  against	  irregular	  migration,	  a	  series	  of	  obstacles	  
forced	   the	   EU	   to	   revise	   the	   design	   of	   EURA.	   New	   EU	   incentives	   were	   offered:	   a	  Mobility	  
Partnership	  (MP)	  to	  Morocco	  and	  Visa	  liberalization	  to	  Turkey.	  Yet,	  in	  spite	  of	  fine-­‐tuning	  EU	  
incentives	   over	   time,	   this	   article	   finds	   that	   third	   countries’	   political	   domestic	   and	   regional	  
dynamics	  conditions	  the	  politics	  of	  EURA	  instrumentation.	  Concerned	  with	  the	  implications	  
for	  EU	  external	  migration	  policy	  more	  broadly,	  the	  meanings	  and	  representations	  carried	  by	  
EURAs	  in	  third	  countries,	  following	  Le	  Gales	  and	  Lascoumes’	  approach,	  are	  also	  relevant	  to	  
this	  study.	  For	  these	  authors	  a	  public	  policy	  instrument	  is	  ‘a	  device	  that	  is	  both	  technical	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   I	   am	   thankful	   to	  all	   the	  participants	  of	   the	   special	   issue	  and	   the	  workshop	   that	   took	  place	  at	  Queen	  Mary	  
university	   on	   2nd	   and	   3rd	   October	   2013	   as	   well	   as	   Florian	   Trauner,	   Paul	   Copeland	   and	   Tim	   Bale	   for	   their	  
insightful	  feedback.	  	  
2Baldwin-­‐Edwards,	  M.	  (1997).	  ‘The	  Emerging	  European	  Immigration	  Regime:	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  Implications	  
for	  Southern	  Europe’.	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies,	  35:	  p.	  511.	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social,	  that	  organizes	  specific	  social	  relations	  between	  the	  state	  and	  those	  it	  is	  addressed	  to,	  
according	  to	  the	  representations	  and	  meanings	  it	  carries.	  It	  is	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  institution,	  
a	   technical	   device	   with	   the	   generic	   purpose	   of	   carrying	   a	   concrete	   concept	   of	   the	  
politics/society’.3	  This	  necessarily	  implies	  looking	  at	  the	  issues	  of	  power	  and	  appropriateness	  
of	  EURA	  as	  external	  migration	  policy	  instruments.	  	  
 
In	  nature,	  EURAs	  are	  both	  agreement	  and	  incentive-­‐based	  policy	  instruments.	  As	  a	  bilateral	  
agreement	  their	  purpose	   is	   to	  return	   irregular	  migrants.	  Third	  countries	  readmit	  their	  own	  
nationals	  and	   third	  country	  nationals	  having	   transited	   through	   their	   territory.4	  The	  Council	  
opens	   EURAs	  negotiations	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   a	   recommendation	   from	   the	  Commission.	  After	  
several	  rounds	  of	  negotiations,	  the	  Commission	  as	   lead	  negotiator	   issues	  a	  proposal	  to	  the	  
Council	   to	   adopt	   the	   decision	   authorizing	   the	   signature	   of	   the	   EURA	  by	   qualified	  majority	  
voting.5	  The	  European	  Parliament	  needs	  to	  give	  its	  assent.	  In	  the	  third	  country,	  EURA	  can	  be	  
ratified	  by	  Parliament,	  depending	  on	  the	  domestic	  constitutional	  arrangements.	  
	  
EURAs’	  negotiations	   take	  place	   in	  a	  multi-­‐level	  governance	  setting	  both	  within	   the	  EU	  and	  
with	   third	   countries,	   challenging	   the	   traditional	   state-­‐centric	   approach	   to	   public	   policy	  
instruments.6	   Originally,	   readmission	   agreements	   at	   national	   level	   date	   back	   to	   the	   19th	  
century7	   and	   have	   been	   widely	   used	   after	   the	   WWII.	   After	   the	   Amsterdam	   treaty,	   EU	  
member	  states	  delegated	   this	   competence	  at	  EU	   level.	   It	  aroused	  a	   lot	  of	  attention	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   Lascoumes,	  P.	   and	  P.	   Le	  Gales,	   (2007).	   Introduction:	  Understanding	  Public	  Policy	   through	   its	   Instruments—
From	  the	  Nature	  of	  Instruments	  to	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Public	  Policy	  Instrumentation.	  Governance	  20(1),	  pp.	  1-­‐21.	  
4	  The	  third-­‐country	  nationals	  clause	   is	  the	  most	  polemical	  clause	  of	  the	  agreement	  with	  third	  countries	  which	  
need	   to	   be	   process	   the	   detention	   and	   return	   of	   those	   non-­‐nationals,	   therefore	   perpetuating	   the	   chain	   of	  
readmission.	   Administrative	   capacities	   but	   also	   strong	   legal	   systems	   should	   ensure	   the	   safe	   and	   humane	  
detention.	  
5	  Article	  79.3TFEU	  and	  218TFEU.	  
6	   Kassim,	   H.	   and	   P.	   Le	   Galès	   (2010).	   Exploring	   Governance	   in	   a	   Multi-­‐Level	   Polity:	   A	   Policy	   Instruments	  
Approach.	  West	  European	  Politics	  33(1),	  pp.	  1-­‐21.	  
7	  Coleman,	  N.	  (2009).	  European	  Readmission	  Policy:	  Third	  Country	  Interests	  and	  Refugee	  Rights.	  Brill.	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literature	   given	   the	   turf	   wars	   it	   generated	   between	   the	   European	   Commission	   and	   EU	  
member	   states.	   8	   Compromising	   on	   a	   shared	   competence,	   the	   Commission	   ‘has	   not	  
withdrawn	  its	  claimed	  on	  exclusivity’.9	  It	  is	  regularly	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  Council,	  which	  since	  
Lisbon	  has	  reasserted	  its	  ultimate	  political	  role	  over	  JHA	  issues	  such	  as	  visa	  liberalization.10	  	  
	  
Negotiations	  and	  implementation	  of	  EURAs	  with	  third	  countries	  are	  also	  often	  undermined	  
by	   EU	   member	   states’	   informal	   bilateral	   readmission	   mechanisms.	   Those	   ‘non-­‐standard	  
agreements’	  take	  the	  form	  of	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  and	  letters	  of	  exchange	  with	  
third	   countries.	   Allowing	   for	   flexible	   and	   informal	   readmission,	   they	   fall	   outside	  
parliamentary	   and/or	   judicial	   scrutiny11	   and	   undermine	   the	   credibility	   of	   EU	   readmission	  
policy	  as	  well	  as	  human	  rights	  and	  international	  protection	  guarantees.12	  	  
	  
EURAs	   are	   also	   incentive-­‐based	   instruments	   coupled	  with	  migration,	   border	  management	  
operational	   and	   financial	   support,	   visa	   facilitation/liberalization	   or	   mobility	   partnerships	  
(MP).13	  14	  The	  nature	  of	   incentives	  nonetheless	  varies	  depending	  on	  EU’s	  geographical	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	   The	   broader	   political	   finalite	   of	   an	   EURA	   seems	   to	   be	  what	  motivated	   EU	  member	   states	   to	   enter	   into	   an	  
EURA.	  This	   is	  exemplified	  by	  an	  inquiry	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  asking	  the	  British	  Minister	  of	   Interior	  what	  
was	  the	  added	  value	  of	  EURA	  to	  UK	  readmission	  policy.	  He	  replied	  that	  EURAs	  do	  not	  have	  any	  major	  impact	  on	  
improving	  readmission	   for	  EU	  member	  states	   like	   the	  UK.	  Rather,	   the	  added	  value	   lies	   in	   the	  ability	   to	  reach	  
further	   agreements	   and	   comprehensive	   negotiations	   on	   the	   fight	   against	   irregular	   migration	   (House	   of	  
Commons,	  2011).	  	  
9	  Coleman,	  N.	  (2009).	  Ibid,	  p.	  75	  
10	  Wolff,	  S.	  (2014	  forthcoming).	  ‘Integrating	  in	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs:	  swinging	  between	  deliberation,	  politics	  
and	  operationalization’	  In:	  Bickerton,	  C.,	  D.	  Hodson	  and	  U.	  Puetter	  (2014	  forthcoming).	  European	  Politics	  in	  the	  
Post	  Maastricht	  Period:	  States,	  Supranational	  Actors	  and	  the	  New	  Intergovernmentalism.	  Oxford:	  OUP	  
11	  Cassarino,	  J-­‐P	  (2010).	  Readmission	  Policy	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  Study	  requested	  by	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  
for	  Internal	  Policies’.	  Policy	  Department	  C:	  Citizens’	  rights	  and	  constitutional	  affairs,	  Civil	   liberties,	  Justice	  and	  
Home	  Affairs.	  European	  Parliament,	  Brussels.	  
12	   European	   Commission	   (2011).	   Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	   to	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   the	  
Council.	  Evaluation	  of	  EU	  Readmission	  Agreements.	  Brussels,	  23.2.2011,	  COM(2011)	  76	  final,	  p.	  4.	  
13	   EU	   Mobility	   Partnerships	   organizes	   cooperation	   with	   third	   countries	   on	   legal	   migration,	   migration	   and	  
development	  and	  the	  fight	  against	  irregular	  migration,	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  approach.	  It	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  non-­‐
legally	  binding	   Joint	  Declaration,	  which	   lists	  project	   initiatives.	  Monitoring	   is	   taking	  place	   through	  a	   ‘mobility	  
partnership	  scoreboard’.	  According	  to	  the	  European	  Commission,	  ‘the	  weight	  of	  each	  element	  depends	  on	  the	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strategic	  priorities.	  As	  of	  April	  2013,	  out	  of	  15	  EURAs	  in	  force	  with	  third	  countries,15	  only	  7	  
were	  coupled	  with	  a	  visa	  facilitation	  agreement,	  mainly	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  plus	  Georgia,	  
Turkey	   and	  Ukraine.	  Until	   the	  Arab	   Spring,	   visa	   facilitation	  was	   never	   offered	   to	   Southern	  
Mediterranean	  countries.	  	  
	  
If	   EURA	   policy	   drift,	   inefficiency,	   security	   focus	   as	   well	   as	   fundamental	   rights	   deficiencies	  
have	  been	  extensively	  researched,	  fewer	  studies	  have	  investigated	  third	  countries’	  role.	  The	  
concept	   of	   ‘partnership’	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   Global	   Approach	   to	   Mobility	   and	   Migration	  
(GAMM)	  has	   been	   criticized,	   especially	   towards	   Southern	   countries.	   16	   17	   Research	   on	   EU-­‐
Morocco	   migration	   governance	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   domestic	   organisational	  
factors,18	  while	  the	  AKP’s	  government’s	  adherence	  to	  the	  EURA	  would	  be	  the	  consequence	  
of	   European	   Commission’s	   leadership.19	   The	   Europeanization	   literature	   has	   also	   looked	   at	  
the	   impact	   of	   EURA	   on	   third	   countries’	   policy,	   polity	   and	   politics.	   Following	   its	   signature,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particular	  situation	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  partner	  country’.	  Source:	  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-­‐affairs/what-­‐we-­‐
do/policies/international-­‐affairs/global-­‐approach-­‐to-­‐migration/specific-­‐tools/index_en.htm	  
14	   	   Trauner,	   F.	   and	   I.	   Kruse	   (2008).	   EC	   Visa	   Facilitation	   and	   Readmission	   Agreements:	   A	   New	   Standard	   EU	  
Foreign	  Policy	  Tool?	  European	  Journal	  of	  Migration	  and	  Law	  10(4),	  pp.	  411-­‐38.	  	  
15	  Hong	  Kong,	  Macao,	   Sri	   Lanka,	  Albania,	  Russia,	  Ukraine,	  Macedonia,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  Montenegro,	  
Serbia,	  Moldova,	  Pakistan,	  Georgia	  Cabo	  Verde,	  Armenia.	  Mandates	  were	  given	  to	  the	  European	  Commission	  
for	   China,	   Algeria	   and	   Belarus	   but	   the	   negotiations	   have	   not	   yet	   been	   formally	   launched.	   Morocco	   can	   be	  
considered	  as	  having	  formally	  launched	  the	  negotiations.	  
16	  Lavenex,	  S.	  and	  R.	  Stucky	   (2011).	  Partnering	   for	  migration	   in	  EU	  external	   relations.	   In:	  Kunz,	  R.,	  S.	  Lavenex	  
and	  M.	  Panizzon	  	  (2011)	  Multilayered	  Migration	  Governance:	  The	  Promise	  of	  Partnership.	  London:	  Routledge.	  
17	  Adepoju,	  A.,	  F.	  van	  Noorloos	  and	  A.	  Zoomers	  (2010).	  	  Europe’s	  Migration	  Agreements	  with	  Migrant-­‐Sending	  
Countries	  in	  the	  Global	  South:	  A	  Critical	  Review.	  International	  Migration,	  48(3),	  pp.	  42-­‐75.	  
18	  Wunderlich,	  D.	  (2012).	  The	  limits	  of	  external	  governance:	  implementing	  EU	  external	  migration	  policy.	  Journal	  
of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  19(9),	  pp.1414-­‐1433.	  
19	   Bürgin,	   A	   (2012).	   European	   Commission's	   agency	   meets	   Ankara's	   agenda:	   why	   Turkey	   is	   ready	   for	   a	  
readmission	  agreement.	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  19(6),	  pp.	  883-­‐899.	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Cabo	   Verde	   reformed	   its	   drug-­‐trafficking	   and	   irregular	   migration	   policies.20	   In	   Albania,	  
institutional	  and	  procedural	  changes	  enabled	  to	  enforce	  the	  third	  country	  nationals	  clause.21	  	  
	  
Building	  on	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  work,	  this	  article	  analyses	  the	  politics	  of	   instrumentation	  
of	  EURA	  from	  a	   third	  country	  perspective,	  notably	  at	   the	   level	  of	  negotiations.	  Turkey	  and	  
Morocco	   account	   for	   a	  most	   different	   systems	   research	   design	   as	   they	   display	   important	  
differences	  in	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  EU	  and	  in	  their	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  systems.	  
Yet	   they	   share	   a	   similar	   hard	   bargainers	   position	   and	   a	   recent	   shift	   in	   EURA	  negotiations.	  
Investigating	  Morocco’s	   and	   Turkey’s	   resilience	   to	   sign	   an	   EURA,	   this	   article	   finds	   that	   EU	  
incentives	  had	  to	  be	  revised	  and	  fine-­‐tuned	  over	  time	  by	  linking	  it	  to	  a	  MP	  for	  Morocco	  and	  
to	   a	   visa	   liberalization	   dialogue	   for	   Turkey.	   These	   incentives	   have	   nonetheless	   been	  
constrained	   by	   domestic	   and	   regional	   factors.	   Finally,	   beyond	   their	   ‘hard	   bargainer’	  
discourses,	  this	  article	  finds	  that	  Morocco’s	  and	  Turkey’s	  border	  management	  and	  migration	  
control	   practices	   fit	   the	  meanings	   and	   representation	   of	   EU	  migration	   governance	   carried	  
over	   by	   EURA	   as	   a	   policy	   instrument.	   Document	   and	   content	   analysis	   of	   EU,	   Moroccan,	  
Turkish	  officials	  declarations	  and	  press	  releases	  is	  used	  to	  process-­‐	  trace	  the	  negotiations.	  A	  
number	   of	   targeted	   interviews	  were	   also	   held	   between	  April	   2013	   and	   July	   2013	  with	   EU	  
officials	   from	   DG	   Enlargement,	   DG	   JHA,	   Turkish	   and	  Moroccan	   officials,	   NGOs,	   as	   well	   as	  
Member	  States.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	   European	   Commission	   (2008).	   Cap	   Vert-­‐Communauté	   Européenne.	   Document	   de	   Stratégie	   Pays	   et	  
Programme	   Indicatif	   National	   pour	   la	   période	   2008-­‐2013.	   Accessed	   on	   15	   April	   2013	   at	  
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/scanned_cv_csp10_fr.pdf	  
21	  Dedja,	  S.	  (2012).	  The	  Working	  of	  EU	  Conditionality	  in	  the	  Area	  of	  Migration	  Policy.	  The	  Case	  of	  Readmission	  
of	  Irregular	  Migrants	  to	  Albania.	  East	  European	  Politics	  and	  Societies,	  26(1),	  pp.	  115-­‐134.	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1-­‐	   Explaining	   the	   politics	   of	   EURAs:	   EU	   incentives	   and	   Third	  
countries’	  preferences	  
	  
This	   article	   researches	   why	   third	   countries	   negotiate	   EURA	   and	   whether	   the	   path	   of	  
negotiations	   can	   lead	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   design	   of	   the	   policy	   instrument.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	  
analyses	  the	  ‘power	  dynamics	  and	  social	  relations	  that	  underlie	  the	  selection	  of	  instruments’	  
but	  also	  what	  EURA	  negotiations	  with	  hard	  bargainers’	  countries	  can	  reveal	  about	  the	  way	  
‘instruments	   change	   over	   time	   and	   their	   (intended	   and	   unintended)	   consequences	   for	  
politics	  and	  policy’.22	  This	   implies	  exploring	   the	   ‘wider	  social	  and	  political	   context	   in	  which	  
instruments	  are	  adopted	  and	  operationalized’	  23	  by	  a	  third	  country.	  
	  
I	   adopt	   a	   four-­‐steps	   approach.	   First,	   I	   analyse	   EU	   incentives	   since	   ‘there	   is	   no	   single	   third	  
country	   that	   is	   happy	   to	   sign	   an	   EURA’,24	  which	   are	   seen	   as	   ‘EU	  monologues	  where	   little	  
interest	   exists	   on	   the	   other	   side’.25	   Negotiating	   an	   EURA	   is	   costly	   domestically,	   especially	  
when	  readmitting	  third	  country	  nationals.	  Countries	  signing	  an	  EURA	  are	  usually	  motivated	  
by	   (i)	   the	   perspective	   of	   enlargement	   and	   (ii)	   the	   perspective	   of	   visa	   facilitation/	   visa	  
liberalization.26	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  EU’s	  Eastern	  neighbours	  and	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  where	  
EURAs	  combined	  to	  visa	  facilitation	  regimes	  help	  to	  ‘mitigate	  the	  negative	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  
eastern	  enlargement’.27	  This	  was	  the	  case	  for	  Albania	  where	  the	  prospect	  of	  pre-­‐accession	  
was	  motivated	  high-­‐level	  officials	   to	  comply	  with	   the	  EURA	   requirements,	   in	   spite	  of	   ‘high	  
domestic	   costs’.28	   The	   ‘external	   incentive	   model’	   has	   theorized	   the	   successfulness	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Kassim,	  H.	  and	  P.	  Le	  Galès	  (2010),	  Ibid.	  p.	  7	  
23	  Kassim,	  H.	  and	  P.	  Le	  Galès	  (2010),	  Ibid.	  p.	  11	  
24	  Interviewee	  C	  	  
25	   Roig,	   A.	   and	   T.	   Huddleston	   (2007).	   EC	   readmission	   agreements:	   a	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	   political	   impasse.	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Migration	  Law,	  9,	  p.	  374	  
26	  Roig,	  A.	  and	  T.	  Huddleston	  (2007).	  Ibid.	  
27	  Trauner,	  F.	  and	  I.	  Kruse	  (2008).	  Ibid,	  p.	  411.	  
28	  Dedja,	  S.	  (2012),	  p.	  131.	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credibility	   of	   EU	   incentives,	   which	   rely	   on	   international,	   and	   domestic	   factors	   as	   well	   as	  
material	  gains	  and	  legitimacy	  issues.29	  I	  therefore	  expect	  that	  Turkey	  and	  Morocco	  should	  be	  
inclined	   to	   sign	   an	   EURA	   where	   EU	   incentives	   are	   ‘clear,	   credible	   and	   sizeable’.	   My	   first	  
hypothesis	  is:	  
	  
	  H1	  The	  more	  the	  external	  incentive	  is	  clear,	  credible,	  sizeable	  and	  temporally	  close	  
the	  more	  likely	  is	  the	  signature	  of	  an	  EURA.	  
	  
Second,	  wider	  domestic	  political	  dynamics	  matter.	  Signing	  an	  EURA	  domestically	  depends	  on	  
the	  costs	  it	  implies	  for	  adopting	  the	  new	  rule	  by	  the	  government.	  Costs	  can	  be	  material	  but	  
also	  institutional	  and	  societal	  through	  veto	  players.	  Societal	  mobilisation,	  supportive	  formal	  
institutions	   as	   well	   as	   administrative	   capacities	   can	   foster	   or	   hamper	   EU	   conditionality,	  
which	  will	  affect	  differently	  policy	  outcomes30	  depending	  on	  their	  preferences.31	  EURA	  are	  
usually	  high-­‐level	  and	   informal	   involving	  Moroccan	  and	  Turkey	  veto	  players	  that	  can	  range	  
from	  the	  heads	  of	  state	  and	  government,	  coalition	  governments,	  constitutional	  courts.	  They	  
are	   empowered	   differently,	   depending	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   regime	   (nondemocratic,	  
presidential,	  parliamentary).	  My	  second	  hypothesis	  is	  therefore	  
	  
H2	  The	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  domestically,	  the	  more	  difficult	  the	  EURA.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	   Sedelmeier,	   U.	   (2011).	   Europeanisation	   in	   new	  member	   and	   candidate	   states.	   Living	   Reviews	   in	   European	  
Governance,	  6(1),	  Accessed	  on	  6	  September	  2013	  at	  http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-­‐2011-­‐1.	  
	  
30	   Tsebelis,	  G.	   (1999).	  Veto	  players	   and	   Law	  production	   in	  Parliamentary	  democracies:	  An	  empirical	   analysis.	  
American	  political	  science	  review,	  93(3),	  pp.	  591-­‐608.	  
31	  Ganghoff,	  S.	  (2003).	  Promises	  and	  Pitfalls	  of	  Veto	  Player	  Analysis.	  Swiss	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  9(2),p.	  13	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Third,	   due	   to	   the	   regional	   nature	   of	   migratory	   fluxes	   though	   (see	   editorial),	   it	   is	   also	  
necessary	  to	  analyse	  the	  broader	  regional	  power	  dynamics	  of	  EURAs	  negotiations.	  The	  third	  
hypothesis	  is:	  
H3	   The	   higher	   the	   costs	   for	   the	   regional	   position	   of	   the	   third	   country,	   the	   more	  
difficult	  the	  EURA.	  
	  
Fourth,	   the	   domestic	   appropriateness	   of	   EURAs	   in	   the	   third	   country	   is	   relevant.	   In	   the	  
sociological	  tradition,	  actors	  engaged	  in	  a	  negotiation	  can	  be	  socialized	  to	  EU	  norms	  such	  as	  
the	  concept	  of	  ‘circular	  migration’	  and	  the	  ‘control	  of	  borders’.	  EURA	  negotiations	  can	  lead	  
to	   ‘persuasion’	   and	   ‘socialisation’	   strategies	   to	   politicize	   or	   depoliticize	   EURA	   as	   a	   policy	  
instrument	  and	  impact	  its	  appropriateness	  at	  domestic	  level.	  32	  This	  requires	  looking	  at	  the	  
public	  debate;	  the	  media	  and	  the	  discourse	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  at	  home	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  
which	   norms	   are	   being	   seen	   as	   appropriate.	   EURA	   negotiations	   can	   lead	   to	   ‘intense	  
(discursive)	   struggles	   and	   re-­‐produce	   meanings,	   subjects	   and	   resistances’.33	   Through	  
politicization	  it	  become	  ‘contested	  amongst	  a	  widening	  circle	  of	  political	  actors’.34	  Inversely	  
de-­‐politicization	  removes	  an	   instrument	   from	  this	  platform	  of	  debate	  and	  contestation,	  by	  
putting	   forward	   its	   technical	   and	   output-­‐oriented	   nature.35	   New	   EU	   migration	   policy	  
instruments	   designed	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘circular	   migration’,	   ‘partnerships’	   and	  
‘cooperation’	  since	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  helped	  the	  Commission	  to	  break	  away	  from	  old	  coercive	  
style.36	  Yet,	  EU	  incentives	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  functional	  reality	  of	  migration	  fluxes,	  thereby	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Sedelmeier,	  U.	  (2011).	  Ibid,	  p.	  11	  
33	  Kunz,	  R.	  and	  J.	  Maisenbacher	  (2013).	  Beyond	  conditionality	  versus	  cooperation:	  Power	  and	  resistance	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  EU	  mobility	  partnerships	  and	  Swiss	  migration	  partnerships.	  Migration	  Studies,	  1(2),	  p.	  196.	  
34	   Hooghe,	   L.	   and	   G.	   Marks	   (2006).	   The	   neo-­‐functionalists	   were	   (almost)	   right:	   politicization	   and	   European	  
integration.	  In:	  C.	  Crouch	  and	  W.	  Streeck	  (2006).	  The	  diversity	  of	  democracy.	  A	  Tribute	  to	  Philippe	  C.	  Schmitter.	  
Edgar	  Elgar,	  pp.	  205-­‐222.	  
35	  Majone,	  G.	  (1996).	  Regulating	  Europe.	  Routledge.	  
36	  Kunz,	  R.	  and	  J.	  Maisenbacher,	  (2013),	  Ibid.	  p.	  197	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reflecting	   highly	   political	   choices	   and	   power	   struggles,	   which	   are	   at	   odds	   with	   ‘logic	   of	  
appropriateness’	  of	  third	  countries.	  In	  2012,	  86%	  of	  the	  total	  EU	  external	  borders’	  detections	  
occurred	  on	  either	  the	  Central	  Mediterranean	  route	  namely	  from	  Libya	  and	  Tunisia,	  on	  the	  
Turkish/Greek	   border	   and	   the	   Western	   Mediterranean	   route	   going	   from	   Morocco	   and	  
Algeria	   to	  Spain.37	  And	  yet,	  up	  until	   the	  Arab	  Spring	  no	  visa	   facilitation	  was	  offered	  by	  the	  
EU.	   This	   can	   then	   affect	   the	   ‘logic	   of	   appropriateness’	   in	   the	   third	   country.	   My	   fourth	  
hypothesis	  is	  therefore:	  	  
H4	   The	   more	   appropriate	   is	   EU	   external	   migration	   policy	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   a	   third	  
country,	  the	  higher	  are	  the	  chances	  of	  the	  EURA	  to	  be	  signed.	  
	  
3.	  EURA	  negotiations	  with	  Morocco	  
Between	   the	   start	   of	   the	   negotiations	  with	  Morocco	   in	   2000	   and	   the	   political	   agreement	  
reached	  in	  March	  2013	  on	  a	  Mobility	  Partnership	  (MP),	  EURA	  were	  stalled.	  While	  the	  draft	  
text	  of	  the	  EURA	  was	  received	  by	  Morocco	  in	  April	  2001,	  ‘informal	  preparatory	  meetings,	  as	  
well	   as	  discussion	  with	   in	   the	  EU-­‐Morocco	  Association	  Council,	  was	  necessary	   to	   convince	  
Morocco	  to	  comments	  formal	  negotiations	  finally	  in	  April	  2003.’38	  	  Between	  April	  2003	  and	  
November	   2005,	   eight	   rounds	   of	   unsuccessful	   formal	   negotiations	   took	   place.39	   In	   2004	  
though,	  at	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  negotiations	  on	  the	  ENP	  Action	  Plan,	  the	  Council	  affirmed	  that	  
it	  key	  priority	   included	  the	  ‘effective	  management	  of	  migration	  flows,	   including	  the	  signing	  
of	   a	   RA	   with	   the	   European	   Community,	   and	   facilitating	   the	   movement	   of	   persons	   in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   acquis,	   particularly	   by	   examining	   the	   possibilities	   for	   relaxing	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Frontex	  (2012).	  Annual	  Risk	  Analysis.	  Available	  at	  	  
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2012_final.pdf,	  p.	  14	  
38	  Coleman,	  (2009),	  Ibid,	  p.	  150.	  
39	   Coleman,	   (2009),	   Ibid,	   p.	   151;	   Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (2005).	   Fifth	   meeting	   of	   the	   EU-­‐Morocco	  
Association	  Council.	  Brussels,	  22	  November	  2005,	  14738/05	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formalities	   for	   certain	   jointly	   agreed	   categories	   of	   persons	   to	   obtain	   short-­‐stay	   visas’.40	   In	  
total,	  as	  of	  2013,	  there	  were	  15	  rounds	  of	  unsuccessful	  negotiations;	   the	   last	  round	  taking	  
place	   on	   10	   may	   2010.41	   	   A	   breakthrough	   happened	   nonetheless	   in	   March	   2013	   with	   a	  
political	  agreement	  on	  a	  MP,	  which	  was	  then	  signed	  in	  June	  2013.	  	  
	  
3.1.	  EU	  incentives’	  evolution	  over	  time	  
	  
Very	   early	   on,	   high-­‐level	   Moroccan	   officials	   were	   concerned	   of	   being	   the	   ‘Gendarme’	   on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  still	  continue	  to	  do	  so.42	  Unlike	  other	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Association	  
Agreements,	  Morocco	  does	  not	  have	  a	  readmission	  clause.	  In	  2000,	  a	  ‘permanent	  dialogue	  
on	   immigration’	   was	   initiated	   between	   Morocco	   and	   the	   High-­‐Level	   Working	   Group	   on	  
Asylum	  and	  Migration	   (HLWG).43	  The	  HLWG,	  created	   in	  1998,	  prepared	   ‘cross-­‐pillar	  Action	  
Plans	   for	   the	   countries	   of	   origin	   and	   transit	   of	   asylum	   seekers	   and	   migrants’	   including	  
Afghanistan,	   Somalia,	   Sri	   Lanka,	   Iraq,	   Albania	   and	   Morocco.	   TheMoroccan	   authorities	  
considered	  the	  Action	  plan	  towards	  of	  11	  October	  1999	  as	  ‘lack[ing]	  balance,	  particularly	  in	  
its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   ‘security	   dimension’’.44	   Difficulties	   of	   implementation,	   the	   lack	   of	   EU	  
member	   states’	   commitment	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   measures	   of	   ‘effective	   implementation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (2004).	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Decision	  on	  the	  position	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  the	  
European	   Community	   and	   its	   Member	   States	   within	   the	   Association	   Council	   established	   by	   the	   Euro-­‐
Mediterranean	  Agreement	  establishing	  an	  association	  between	  the	  European	  Communities	  and	  their	  Member	  
States,	   of	   the	   one	   part,	   and	   the	   Kingdom	   of	  Morocco,	   of	   the	   other	   part,	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	  
Recommendation	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  EU/Morocco	  Action	  Plan.	  16162/04;	  	  
41	  Belguendouz,	  A,	  (2013).	  Reflexions	  sur	  le	  projet	  de	  partenariat	  euro-­‐marocain	  pour	  la	  mobilite.	  Accessed	  on	  
13	  April	  2013	  at	  
http://nancy.maglor.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1773%3Areflexions-­‐sur-­‐le-­‐projet-­‐de-­‐
partenariat-­‐euro-­‐marocain-­‐pour-­‐la-­‐mobilite&catid=139%3Aaccueil&Itemid=83	  
42	  Interviewee	  E.	  
43	   Council	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   (2000).	   High-­‐level	  working	   group	   on	   asylum	   and	  migration.	   Report	   to	   the	  
European	  Council	  in	  Nice.	  Available	  at	  	  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/13993.en0%20ann.doc.html	  
44	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (2000),	  Ibid.	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existing	   readmission	   agreement’	   were	   raised.	   Morocco	   also	   had	   the	   ‘impression	   of	  
imbalance	   in	   the	  Action	   Plans	   and	   the	   countries	   at	  which	   the	   plans	   are	   directed	   feel	   that	  
they	  are	  the	  target	  of	  unilateral	  policy	  by	  the	  Union	  focusing	  on	  repressive	  action’.45	  In	  2002	  
the	  EU	  provided	  €70	  million	  for	  the	  development	  of	  Northern	  Morocco	  to	  encourage	  EURA	  
negotiations,46	  along	  with	  several	  other	  financial	  incentives	  since	  then.47	  They	  failed	  though	  
to	  facilitate	  EURA	  negotiations	  until	  2013.	  
	  
The	  Commission	  realised	  early	  on	  that	  EURA	  negotiations	  would	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  unless	  
EU	  member	  states	  would	  be	  ready	  to	  offer	  credible	  incentives	  such	  as	  visa	  facilitation.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  Morocco	  progress	  did	  not	  happen	  until	  ‘it	  became	  a	  very	  comprehensive	  programme	  
and	   the	  perspective	  of	  visa	   facilitation	  was	   integrated	   in	  a	   ‘package	  deal’’.48	  The	   later	  was	  
negotiated	  in	  parallel	  to	  the	  ENP	  Action	  Plan	  for	  2012-­‐2016	  negotiations,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  
Advanced	   Status	   Action	   Plan,	   which	   also	   involved	   negotiations	   on	   a	   Deep	   and	  
Comprehensive	   Free	   Trade	   Agreement.49	   According	   to	   DG	   Home	   affairs’	   officials,	   EURA	  
negotiations	   sensibly	   shifted	   from	   the	  moment	   the	   Commission	   was	   able	   to	   convince	   EU	  
member	  states	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  MP	  as	  a	  substantial	  incentive.	  The	  Arab	  Spring	  played	  in	  
favour	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  plea	  towards	  EU	  member	  states	  providing	  a	  ‘momentum	  to	  
change	  the	  approach’.	  Before	  ‘visa	  facilitation	  was	  absolutely	  out	  of	  question	  for	  MS’.	  50	  	  
	  
A	   joint	   political	   declaration	   on	   a	  Mobility	   Partnership	   (MP)	   between	   the	   EU	   and	  Morocco	  
was	   agreed	   in	   June	   2013,	   following	   a	   high-­‐level	   commitment	   of	   President	   Barroso	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  (2000),	  Ibid.	  
46	   GADEM	   (2010)	   ‘The	   Human	   Rights	   of	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Migrants	   in	   Morocco’	   Open	   Society	   Justice	   Initiative	  
Report,	  p.	  7.	  
47	  Wolff,	  S.	  (2012).	  The	  Mediterranean	  Dimension	  of	  EU’s	  Internal	  Security.	  London:	  Palgrave.	  
48	  Interviewee	  C	  
49	  Interviewee	  C	  
50	  Interviewee	  A	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Commissioner	   Malmström.51	   	   It	   was	   preceded	   by	   a	   joint	   document	   by	   Lady	   Ashton	   and	  
President	  Barroso	  on	  ‘A	  Partnership	  for	  Shared	  Democracy	  and	  Prosperity’	  and	  a	  DG	  Home-­‐
led	   communication	   on	   ‘A	   dialogue	   for	   migration,	   mobility	   and	   security	   with	   the	   southern	  
Mediterranean	  countries’.52	  Content	  analysis	   reveals	  a	   shift	   towards	  more	   ‘mobility’	   in	   the	  
Commission’s	   discourse.	   The	   word	   ‘mobility’	   is	   used	   40	   times	   in	   the	   document,	   amongst	  
which	   15	   times	   under	   the	   form	   of	   ‘mobility	   partnership’.	   References	   to	   ‘security’	   are	   less	  
prominent	  (12	  times),	  	  ‘irregular	  migration’	  9	  times,	  ‘readmission’	  7	  times	  and	  ‘control’	  only	  
3	   times.	   Incentives	   include	   a	   financial	   ‘package	   of	   capacity	   building	   measures,	   technical	  
assistance	   on	   legal	   migration	   (i.e.	   to	   develop	   ‘active	   labour	   market	   policy	   programs’,	  
avoiding	  brain	  drain,	  diminishing	  fees	  for	  remittances	  and	  diaspora	  investment).	  In	  line	  with	  
the	   EU	   concept	   of	   circular	   migration,	   migrants	   will	   come	   temporarily	   to	   Europe	   and	   be	  
supported	   through	   a	   series	   of	   measures,	   including	   ‘voluntary	   return	   arrangements’	   to	   go	  
back	   to	   their	   home	   country.	   Security	   support	   is	   also	   offered	   through	   the	   conclusion	   of	  
‘working	   arrangements	   with	   Frontex’,	   developing	   border	   management	   capacities,	  
cooperation	  on	  the	  ‘EUROSUR	  project’,	  with	  the	  European	  Asylum	  Support	  Office	  (EASO)	  and	  
with	  Europol.	  53	  	  
	  
The	   June	   2013	   Joint	   Declaration	   on	   the	  MP	   specifies	   further	   the	   partnership	   around	   four	  
main	   objectives:	   (i)	   to	   manage	   the	   labour	   migration	   more	   effectively’	   (ii)	   to	   strengthen	  
cooperation	  on	  migration	   and	  development	   ‘in	  order	   to	   exploit	   the	  potential	   of	  migration	  
and	  its	  positive	  effects	  of	  Morocco	  and	  European	  countries’	  (iii)	  combat	  illegal	  immigration,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Interviewee	  F	  
52	   European	   Commission	   (2011a).	   A	   dialogue	   for	   migration,	   mobility	   and	   security	   with	   the	   southern	  
Mediterranean	  countries.	  Communication	  COM(2011)	  292	  final,	  Brussels,	  24th	  of	  May	  2011.	  
53	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (2013).	  Joint	  declaration	  establishing	  a	  partnership	  between	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  
Morocco	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  its	  member	  states.	  Brussels,	  3	  June	  2013,	  6139/13.	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human	   being	   trafficking	   and	   smuggling,	   to	   promote	   an	   effective	   readmission	   policy	  
respectful	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  ‘ensuring	  the	  dignity	  of	  the	  people	  concerned’	  	  and	  (iv)	  
to	   comply	   with	   international	   instruments	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   refugees.	   The	   EURA	  
negotiations	  should,	  in	  this	  context,	  be	  ‘resumed’.54	  	  
	  
The	  new	  MP	  however	  does	  not	  yet	  challenge	  the	  long-­‐term	  structuring	  role	  that	  EURA	  has	  
had	  on	  EU-­‐Moroccan	  migration	  cooperation.55	  First,	   this	   structuring	  has	  been	  exploited	  by	  
Morocco.	  The	  stalling	  of	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  EURA	  has	  been	  paralleled	  by	  a	  satisfactory	  
cooperation	  through	  bilateral	   ‘non-­‐standards	  agreements’	  between	  EU	  member	  states	  and	  
Morocco.	   Morocco	   has	   concluded	   readmission	   agreements,	   although	   only	   for	   Moroccan	  
nationals,	  with	  Germany	  (1998),	  France	  (1993,	  2001),	  Portugal	  (1999),	  Italy	  (1998,	  1999)	  and	  
Spain	  (1992,	  2003).56	  This	  led	  to	  ‘unintended	  consequences’,	  drifting	  away	  from	  the	  original	  
goal	  of	  EURA.57	  Pursuing	  negotiations	  with	  the	  EU	  in	  parallel	  helped	  nonetheless	  Morocco	  to	  
gain	   influence	   on	   the	   EU’s	   agenda	   by	   forcing	   its	   way	   in	   and	   putting	   forward	   more	  
‘comprehensive’	  migration	  demands	  on	  the	  table.	  	  
	  
Second,	  structural	  differences	  between	  the	  Commission	  and	  member	  states	  remain.	  For	  the	  
Commission	  the	  MP	   is	  an	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  a	   forum	  where	  to	  discuss	  visa	   facilitation	  
issues	  with	  Morocco	  as	  a	  credible	  incentive.	  For	  EU	  member	  states	  though	  the	  MP	  constitute	  
a	  new	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  national	  preferences58	  and	  to	  remain	  in	  control	  of	  cooperation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (2013).	  Ibid,	  p.	  7	  
55	   Halpern,	   C	   (2010).	   Governing	   Despite	   its	   Instruments?	   Instrumentation	   in	   EU	   Environmental	   Policy.	  West	  
European	  Politics,	  33(1),p.	  45	  
56	   Bartolomeo	   and	   al.	   (2009).	   CARIM	   Migration	   Profile.	   Morocco.	   Accessed	   on	   18	   April	   2013	   at	  
http://www.carim.org/public/migrationprofiles/MP_Morocco_EN.pdf	  
57	  	  Halpern,	  C.	  (2010),	  Ibid,	  p.	  45	  
58	   Renslow,	   N.	   (2012).	   Deciding	   on	   EU	   External	   Migration	   Policy:	   The	   Member	   States	   and	   the	   Mobility	  
Partnerships.	  Journal	  of	  European	  Integration,	  34(3),	  pp.	  223-­‐239.	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with	  Morocco.	  In	  the	  Joint	  Declaration	  on	  the	  MP,	  it	  is	  thus	  worth	  noting	  that	  out	  of	  the	  37	  
new	   projects	   listed,	   28	   tackle	   irregular	   migration,	   14	   legal	   migration,	   7	   migration-­‐
development	  issues,	  and	  6	  international	  protection.	  By	  opting	  for	  issue-­‐linkage	  with	  the	  MP,	  
EU	  member	   states	   keep	  a	   firm	  hand	  on	  pilot	   projects	  where	   they	   take	   the	   lead.	   This	   also	  
increases	  their	  bargaining	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Commission	  and	  Morocco.59	  The	  MP	  reveals	  an	  
inherently	   political	   choice	   behind	   issue-­‐linkage	   of	   policy	   instruments,	   displaying	   power	  
struggles	  behind	  a	  technocratic	  language	  that	  occasionally	  covers	  it.	  60	  	  
	  
This	  is	  precisely	  illustrated	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  visa	  liberalization	  in	  the	  MP.	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  
establish	   a	   visa	   facilitation	   agreement	   for	   some	   categories	   of	   travellers	   such	   as	   students,	  
researchers	   and	   businessmen.61	   The	  MP	   is	   also	   not	   a	   Common	   Agenda	   on	  Migration	   and	  
Mobility	  (CAMM),	  envisaged	  by	  the	  revised	  2011	  GAMM	  and	  that	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  notion	  
of	   ‘partnership’.62	   The	   two	   main	   objectives	   are	   therefore	   to	   ease	   EU	   visa	   policy	   towards	  
some	  categories	  of	  Moroccan	  citizens	  and	  to	  sign	  an	  EURA.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  text	  of	  
the	  MP	  is	   ‘far	  from	  ideal’	   for	  EU	  member	  states,	  63	   	  who	  prefer	   ‘to	  sign	  the	  EURA	  first	  and	  
that	   later	   on	  we	  will	   discuss	   visa	   facilitation’.64	   This	   contrasts	  with	   the	   official	   position	   of	  
Menouar	  Alem,	  the	  Moroccan	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU	  who	  asked	  ‘why	  should	  a	  country	  like	  
Morocco,	  the	  last	  stop	  before	  ‘the	  European	  Eldorado’,	  take	  all	  the	  responsibility?’	  65	  Instead	  
the	  Ambassador	  called	  for	  visa	  facilitation,	  blaming	  the	  ‘double	  standard’	  discourse	  of	  the	  EU	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Kunz,	  R.	  and	  J.	  Maisenbacher,	  (2013),	  Ibid,	  202	  
60	  Bache,	  I.	  (2010).	  Partnership	  as	  an	  EU	  Policy	  Instrument:	  A	  Political	  History.	  West	  European	  Politics,	  33(1),	  pp.	  
58-­‐74;	  	  Kunz,	  R.	  and	  J.	  Maisenbacher,	  (2013),	  Ibid.	  
61	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (2013).	  Ibid.	  
62	  Belguendouz,	  2013,	  Ibid.	  
63	  Interviewee	  F	  
64	  Interviewee	  F	  
65	   EPC	   (2012).	   ‘EU	   Readmission	   Agreements:	   towards	   a	   more	   strategic	   EU	   approach	   that	   respects	   human	  
rights?’.	  Policy	  Dialogue,	  21	  March	  2012.	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66	   and	   reiterating	   one	   of	   the	   constant	   Moroccan	   demands	   to	   facilitate	   channels	   of	   legal	  
migration	  to	  the	  EU.67	  	  
	  
Linking	  the	  EURA	  negotiations	  to	  the	  MP	  confirms	  our	  first	  hypothesis	  according	  to	  which	  EU	  
incentives	   need	   to	   be	   clear,	   sizeable	   and	   credible.	   Our	   analysis	   reveals	   two	   additional	  
dimensions.	   	   First,	   there	   are	   politicization	   dynamics	   at	   hand,	   the	   Commission	   having	  
managed	  to	  push	  for	  visa	  facilitation	  while	  EU	  member	  states	  remain	  the	  gatekeepers	  of	  the	  
incentive	   through	   the	   choice	   and	   design	   of	   the	  MP.	   Second,	   power	   interdependences	   are	  
reflected	   in	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   June	   2013	   MP	   declaration,	   which	   is	   conditioned	   to	   the	  
implementation	  of	  both	  ‘visa	  and	  readmission	  facilitation	  agreements’.68	  Morocco	  managed	  
to	   link	   the	  EURA	   to	  a	  broader	  agenda	  with	   the	  MP,	  which	  deals	  as	  much	  as	  with	  borders,	  
than	  with	  migration	  and	  development.69	  Dynamics	  of	  (de)	  politicization	  are	  therefore	  key	  in	  
understanding	  the	  impact	  of	  EU	  incentives.	  
	  
3.2.	  Domestic	  and	  Regional	  Context:	  the	  politicization	  of	  EURA	  
	  
Beyond	  EU	   incentives,	  domestic	  veto	  players	  and	  regional	  dynamics	  are	  also	  key	   in	  driving	  
Morocco’s	  preferences	  on	  the	  EURA	  negotiations.	  	  
	  
First,	  in	  spite	  of	  Morocco	  being	  governed	  since	  2011	  by	  the	  Justice	  and	  Development	  Party	  
(PJD),	  an	  Islamist	  party,	  the	  official	  line	  remains	  that	  Morocco	  is	  not	  the	  ‘EU	  Gendarme’.	  The	  
PJD	  has	  been	  co-­‐opted	  and	  that	  the	  King	  remains	  the	  main	  arbitrator.	  It	  leads	  a	  cumbersome	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  EPC	  (2012),	  Ibid.,	  p.5	  
67	  Roig	  and	  Huddleston,	  (2007),	  Ibid,	  p.	  377.	  
68	  Council	  of	  the	  EU,	  (2013),	  Ibid.,	  p.	  11	  
69	  Interview	  F.	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coalition	  with	   little	   power	   in	   Parliament:	   ’it	   holds	   only	   107	   out	   of	   395	   seats	   in	   the	   lower	  
elected	   house	   of	   parliament	   and	   11	   out	   of	   31	   cabinet	   posts.	   The	   upper	   house,	   indirectly	  
elected	  by	  municipal	  notables,	  is	  still	  dominated	  by	  the	  king’s	  supporters;	  new	  local	  elections	  
will	   not	  be	  held	  until	   2013.	   The	  PJD	   is	   also	   constrained	  by	   leading	  a	   coalition	  government	  
that	   includes	   both	   ex-­‐communists	   and	   pro-­‐royalists.70	   The	   King	   ultimate	   political	   role,	  
including	  on	  the	  EURA	  remains,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  French	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  Manuel	  Valls’	  
visit	  in	  July	  2012	  to	  discuss	  visa	  facilitation	  arrangements	  with	  France.71	  Even	  though	  the	  PJD	  
won	  the	  elections	  on	  a	  Social	  justice	  and	  antipoverty	  political	  programme,	  	  migration	  policy	  
towards	   sub-­‐Saharan	   migrants	   is	   absent,	   perpetuating	   past	   policies	   of	   previous	  
governments.	   The	   only	  measures	   on	  migration	  mentioned	   is	  measure	   156,	  which	   aims	   at	  
combatting	  discrimination	  against	  Moroccans	  throughout	  the	  world,	  focusing	  on	  emigration	  
rather	  than	  immigration	  policy,	  like	  in	  the	  old	  days.72	  On	  the	  ground,	  Moroccan	  readmission	  
is	  also	  not	  so	  much	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  structuring	  of	  the	  EURA.	  Security	  cooperation	  between	  
Morocco	   and	   Spain	   has	   been	   reinforced	   since	   Benkirane	   is	   Prime	   Minister.	   A	   bilateral	  
agreement	  to	  facilitate	  visa	  procedures	  for	  some	  categories	  of	  citizens	  was	  signed	  in	  2011.73	  
The	   implementation	   of	   EU	   projects	   is	   monopolised	   by	   the	   Moroccan	  Ministry	   of	   Interior	  
reproducing	   therefore	   its	   repressive	   side.74	   The	   PJD	   has	   therefore	   little	   say	   in	   a	   domestic	  
setting	   where	   Moroccan	   migration	   policy	   veto	   players	   remain	   high-­‐level	   and	   can	   easily	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legislative-­‐2011	  
73	   Jeune	   Afrique	   (2012b).	   ‘Maroc-­‐Espagne,	   une	   relation	   qui	   s’intensifie’.	   Accessed	   on	   17	   April	   2013	   at	  
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121003173414/	  
74	  Wunderlich,	  D.	  (2012),	  Ibid,	  p.1426	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influence	  EURA	  negotiations.	  With	   respect	   to	  H2,	  what	  matters	   is	  not	   the	  number	  of	   veto	  
players	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  but	  rather	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  domestic	  practices	  of	  readmission	  confirm	  that	  EURA	  are	  not	  being	  negotiating	  in	  
a	  complete	  political	  vacuum,	  on	  the	  contrary.	  Morocco	  has	  put	  forward	  the	  ‘technical,	  legal	  
and	   ethical	   difficulties’	   of	   the	   EURA.	   Technical	   issues	   include	   the	   length	   of	   detention,	   the	  
proof	  of	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  irregular	  migrant	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ‘technical’	  issue	  that	  most	  of	  
the	  irregular	  migrants	  come	  from	  the	  Southern	  border	  of	  Morocco,	  namely	  Algeria.75	  Being	  
this	   official	   discourse	   on	   domestic	   costs,	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   with	   the	   practice	   of	   readmission,	  
which	  is	  structured	  by	  securitization.	   Irregular	  migration	  has	  been	  criminalized	  with	   law	  no	  
02-­‐03	  passed	  unanimously	  by	  the	  Parliament	  after	  the	  16	  May	  2003	  attacks	  on	  Casablanca.76	  
Later	   on,	   following	   the	   events	   of	   2005	   in	   Ceuta	   and	   Melilla,	   Morocco	   recruited	   9000	  
supplementary	  agents	  into	  the	  army	  and	  adopted	  a	  new	  policy	  to	  improve	  its	  border	  control	  
capacities.77	  Return	  operations	  of	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  migrants	  are	  regularly	   taking	  place.	   In	  2003	  
Nigerians	  were	  returned	  from	  the	  Oudja	  airport	  (416	  people),	  Nador	  (on	  3	  November	  2003,	  
207	   people),	   Fes-­‐Saïs	   (480	   s	   people	   on	   20	   December	   2003),	   as	   well	   as	   from	   Tanger	   and	  
Rabat.78	  Several	  other	  instances	  have	  been	  reported	  by	  the	  GADEM.79	  Readmission	  with	  EU	  
Member	   states	   is	   also	   considered	   as	   quite	   advanced,	   and	   was	   successfully	   in	   the	   Canary	  
Islands	   with	   Spain.80	   	   The	   official	   discourse	   of	   ‘ethical	   difficulties’	   also	   contrast	   with	   the	  
situation	  of	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  migrants	   in	  Morocco,	  who,	  according	   to	  Doctors	  without	  borders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Interviewees	  E.	  
76	  Wolff,	  S.	  (2012),	  Ibid,	  p.	  75	  
77	   Lahlou,	  M.	   (2007).	  Migrations	   transméditerranéeennes	   et	   strategies	   euro-­‐africaines.	  Med.	   2007’.	   L’année	  
2006	  dans	  l’espace	  euroméditerranéen’.	  Barcelona,	  IEMED,	  CIDOB,	  p.47;	  Wolff,	  2012,	  Ibid.	  p.	  75.	  	  
78	   Belguendouz,	   A.	   (2010)	   Expansion	   et	   sous-­‐traitance	   des	   logiques	   d’enfermement	   de	   l’Union	   européenne	  :	  
l’exemple	  du	  Maroc.	  Cultures	  &	  Conflits,	  pp.	  155-­‐129	  
79	  Gadem,	  (2010),	  Ibid.	  
80	  Interviewee	  G.	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are	   in	   ‘precarious	   living	  conditions’,	   ‘forced	   to	   live	   in	  and	   the	  widespread	   institutional	  and	  
criminal	  violence	  that	  they	  are	  exposed	  to’	  which	  influence	  their	  ‘medical	  and	  psychological	  
needs’.81	  In	  fact,	  the	  NGOs	  maintains	  that	  ‘the	  period	  since	  December	  2011	  has	  seen	  a	  sharp	  
increase	   in	   abuse,	   degrading	   treatment	   and	   violence	   against	   sub-­‐Saharan	   migrants	   by	  
Moroccan	  and	  Spanish	  security	  forces	  […].	  [There	  are]	  shocking	  levels	  of	  sexual	  violence	  that	  
migrants	  are	  exposed	  to	   throughout	   the	  migration	  process	  and	  demands	  better	  assistance	  
and	  protection	  for	  those	  affected’.82	  
	  
Rather,	  interviews	  reveal	  that	  two	  main	  regional	  concerns	  have	  driven	  Morocco’s	  position	  in	  
negotiating	  with	  the	  EU.	  First,	  a	  key	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  unsuccessful	  to	  secure	  
EURA	  with	  Cotonou	  countries,	   therefore	  fearing	  to	  become	  the	  country	  of	  return	  by	  proxy	  
for	  African	  countries	  refusing	  to	  reaccept	  their	  nationals.83	  Interviewees	  called	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  
get	   involved	   with	   African	   countries,	   but	   also	   more	   specifically	   with	   Algeria.	   According	   to	  
Moroccan	   officials,	   95%	   of	   Morocco’s	   readmission	   with	   EU	   countries	   concerns	   migrants	  
coming	   from	  the	  Algerian	  border.84	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  EU	  has	  asked	  Morocco	   to	   revise	  90	  
days	   visa-­‐free	   policy	   towards	   Algeria,	   Tunisia,	   and	   Libya	   as	   well	   as	   towards	   Mali,	   Niger,	  
Senegal,	  Guinea	  and	  Ivory	  Coast.85	  
	  
This	  evidences	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  perception	  and	  image	  of	  Morocco	  amongst	  its	  regional	  
partners.	   As	   Interviewee	   C	   puts	   it	   ‘Morocco	   wants	   to	   be	   the	   best	   student	   amongst	   ENP	  
neighbours,	  but	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  the	  worst	  student	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  African	  partners	  either’.	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  without	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  A	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82	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  without	  Borders	  (2013),	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  (2009),	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  2012,	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Morocco	  wants	  to	  continue	  to	  have	  good	  relationship	  with	  its	  African	  partners	  and	  avoid	  any	  
kind	  of	  accusation	  by	  Algeria,	  which	  vetoes	  its	  accession	  to	  the	  African	  Union	  and	  with	  whom	  
relations	   are	   poisoned	   by	   the	   Western	   Saharan	   conflict.	   This	   regional	   dimension	   pushed	  
Morocco	  to	   influence	  the	  EU	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  regional	  approach	   in	   its	  
migration	  instrument.	  This	  regional	  consultative	  process,	  by	  focusing	  on	  intergovernmental	  
operational	  cooperation	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  best	  practices	   is	  believed	  to	  favour	  trust	  and	  
cooperation	   in	   an	   area	   “characterised	   by	   great	   uncertainty	   in	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   policy	  
interdependence”.86	   The	   Rabat	   Process	   enabled	  Morocco,	   confronted	   to	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  
uncertainty,	  to	  find	  more	  networking	  opportunities	  and	  to	  influence	  the	  Global	  Approach	  to	  
Migration	   at	   the	   Hampton	   Court	   EU	   Summit.87	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   helped	   to	   forge	   its	  
regional	   leadership	   role	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   African	   partners	   in	   the	   field	   of	   migration	   management.	  
Morocco	  displayed	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  information-­‐based	  and	  operational	  support	  via	  a	  
Regional	   Consultative	   Process,	   which	   favours	   practical	   cooperation	   instead	   of	   the	   EURA.	  
Concerns	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   regional	   partners	   remained	   constant	   demands	   of	   Moroccan	  
officials.88	  They	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  June	  2013	  Political	  Declaration	  on	  the	  MP	  which	  specifies	  
that	  the	  EURA	  negotiations	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  ‘	  the	  promotion	  of	  active	  and	  efficient	  
cooperation	  with	   all	   regional	   partners	   will	   be	   essential	   in	   order	   to	   support	   efforts	   in	   this	  
area’.89	  	  
Interim	  conclusion	  
The	   analysis	   of	   EURA-­‐Morocco	   negotiations	   confirms	   our	   first	   hypothesis.	   Since	   financial	  
incentives	  were	  not	  enough	  and	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  credible	  EU	  incentives	  under	  the	  form	  of	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visa	  facilitation/mobility	  discussions,	  the	  EU	  had	  to	  adapt	  its	  strategy	  and	  decided	  to	  link	  up	  
EURA	  negotiations	   to	   the	  discussion	  on	  a	  MP.	  This	  however	  only	  happened	  after	   the	  Arab	  
Spring,	  member	  states	  resisting	  such	  issue-­‐linkage	  until	  then,	  through	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  
the	  Commission	  mainly	  in	  coupling	  EURA	  negotiations	  to	  the	  MP.	  Yet,	  this	  ‘learning’	  process	  
hides	  the	  politics	  of	  MP	  instrumentation	  whereby	  EU	  member	  states	  remain	  the	  gatekeepers	  
of	   EU	  migration	   policy	   towards	  Morocco.	  Hypotheses	   2,	   3	   and	   4	   are	   then	   interrelated.	   At	  
domestic	  level,	  what	  matters	  is	  not	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  but	  rather	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
ultimate	   decision-­‐making	   power	   lies	   with	   the	   King	   (H2	   is	   disconfirmed).	   EURAs	  
appropriateness	   (H4)	   needs	   to	   be	   read	   together	   with	   our	   findings	   on	   broader	   regional	  
political	  dynamics	   (H3).	  The	  analysis	   finds	   that	   surprisingly,	   in	   spite	  of	  an	  official	  discourse	  
resisting	   playing	   ‘the	   Gendarme	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   EU’,	   there	   is	   a	   gap	  with	   the	   practice	   of	  
Moroccan	  readmission	  with	  regional	  partners	  and	  its	  demands	  for	  ‘ethical’	  concerns	  in	  EURA	  
negotiations.	  Rather,	   the	   role	  and	   image	  of	  Morocco	  as	  a	   regional	  migration	  player	  play	  a	  
bigger	   part	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   instrumentation.	   H3	   is	   therefore	   confirmed	   and	   H4	   is	  
disconfirmed.	  
	  
4.	  EURA	  negotiations	  with	  Turkey	  
The	  opening	  of	  accession	  negotiations	  in	  October	  2005	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  EU	  
decisions.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  initial	  opposition	  of	  Austria	  and	  Cyprus,	  the	  EU	  was	  confronted	  to	  a	  
‘normative	  entrapment’	  to	  consider	  Turkish	  application,	  with	  no	  valid	  reason	  to	  oppose	  it.90	  	  
The	   European	   Commission	   also	   ‘certified	   that	   Turkey	   had	   made	   significant	   progress	   in	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complying	  with	   the	  EU’s	  political	  norms’.91	   Since	  2006	   though	  accession	  negotiations	  have	  
been	  blocked	  due	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  issue	  as	  well	  as	  by	  France	  on	  some	  chapters	  of	  accession.	  In	  
its	  2012	  progress	  report	  on	  Turkey,	  the	  Commission	  raised	  its	  concerns	  on	  ‘Turkey's	  lack	  of	  
substantial	   progress	   towards	   fully	   meeting	   the	   political	   criteria’,	   on	   the	   ‘respect	   for	  
fundamental	   rights’	  especially	   towards	   the	  Kurdish	  minority’.92	   It	   is	   in	   this	  political	   context	  
that	  the	  first	  round	  of	  EURA	  negotiations	  started	  in	  May	  2005.	  In	  June	  2012,	  Turkey	  agreed	  
to	   ‘initial’	   the	  EURA	  but	  refused	  to	  sign	   it	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  credible	  EU	  Commitment	  on	  
visa	  liberalization.	  This	  took	  the	  form	  of	  an	  EU	  roadmap	  that	  was	  subsequently	  negotiated	  in	  
the	  Council	  and	  finalised	  in	  November	  2012.	  	  
	  
4.1.	  Visa	  Liberalization	  Dialogue:	  still	  not	  credible	  enough?	  
In	  2002,	  even	  before	  the	  opening	  of	  Turkish	  accession	  negotiations,	   the	  Council	  mandated	  
the	  Commission	  with	  an	  EURA	  negotiating	  directive.	  The	  Commission,	  and	   in	  particular	  DG	  
Home,	  ‘rallied	  support	  internally	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  link	  [with	  the	  readmission	  agreement	  
negotiations]	  with	   the	  start	  of	  accession	   talks’.93	  Accordingly,	  before	   the	  European	  Council	  
agreed	  to	  the	  candidate	  status	  of	  Turkey	   in	  2004,	   the	  Commission	   ‘repeatedly	  called	  upon	  
the	  Member	  States	  to	  use	  their	  bilateral	  relations	  and	  diplomatic	  contacts	  to	  push	  Turkey	  for	  
a	  prompt	  start	  of	  negotiations	  for	  a	  Community	  readmission	  agreement’.94	  The	  first	  round	  of	  
EURA	  negotiations	  took	  place	  between	  May	  2005	  and	  December	  2006,	  but	  was	  put	  on	  hold	  
until	  2009.95	  Turkish	  partners	  started	  to	  ask	  for	  equal	  treatment	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  	  Schimmelfennig,	  F.	  (2011),	  Ibid,	  p.	  114	  
92	   European	   Commission	   (2012).	   Key	   findings	   of	   the	   2012	   progress	   report	   on	   Turkey.	   Reference:	  
MEMO/12/771,	  	  10/10/2012.	  
93	  Coleman,	  (2009),	  Ibid.,	  p.	  181	  
94	  Coleman,	  (2009),	  Ibid.,	  p.	  181	  
95	  Seeing	  detailed	  timeline	  of	  the	  negotiations	  in	  the	  European	  Commission	  Directive	  	  
http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52012PC0239:EN:HTML	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that	  had	   just	  been	  given	  visa	   liberalization.	   Interview	  H	  confirmed	   that	   surprisingly	  before	  
that	   Turkey	   had	   not	   requested	   visa	   liberalization	   and	   focused	   until	   2007	   on	   financial	  
demands	   for	   border	   management.96	   Turkey	   then	   aligned	   with	   biometric	   passports	  
requirements	  and	  put	  in	  place	  an	  Integrated	  Border	  Management	  strategy.97	  	  
	  
However,	   instead	   of	   opening	   a	   visa	   liberalization	   dialogue,	   EU	   ministers	   of	   interior	  
committed	  to	  a	  very	  loose	  ‘dialogue	  on	  visa,	  mobility	  and	  migration’	  during	  the	  JHA	  Council	  
of	  24	  and	  25	  February	  2011,	  which	  was	  ‘the	  diplomatic	  equivalent	  of	  a	  slap	  in	  the	  face’.98	  DG	  
Home	  and	  DG	  Enlargement	  pushed	  MS	  to	  commit	  and	  to	  link	  EURA	  to	  visa	  liberalization,	  the	  
two	   Directorate-­‐Generals	   working	   hand	   in	   hand.99	   After	   2009,	   the	   negotiations	   were	  
progressing	   on	   19	   articles	   but	   some	   conflicts	   occurred	   on	   five	   articles.	   One	   of	   the	   key	  
concerns	   for	   Turkey	   was	   to	   secure	   some	   funding	   from	   the	   EU	   to	   support	   resettlement	  
policies	   from	  the	  European	  Refugee	  Fund.100	  Also	   it	   feared	  that	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  strong	  
EURA,	  there	  would	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  log	  of	  complains	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  in	  Strasbourg.101	  	  
	  
Accordingly,	  ‘three	  further	  formal	  negotiation	  rounds	  took	  place	  on	  19	  February	  (Ankara),	  19	  
March	   (Ankara)	   and	   17	   May	   2010	   (Brussels).	   An	   additional	   meeting	   between	   the	   Chief	  
negotiators	   was	   held	   on	   14	   January	   2011	   in	   Ankara.	   Those	   meetings	   brought	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Interviewee	  H	  
97	  Interviewees	  H,	  A.	  	  
98	  	  Stiglmayer,	  A.	  (2012).	  Visa-­‐	  Free	  Travel	  for	  Turkey:	  in	  Everybody’s	  Interest.	  Turkish	  Policy,	  11(1).	  	  
99	  Interviewees	  A	  and	  B.	  
100http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2010/06/01/eu-­‐turkey-­‐readmission-­‐agreement-­‐negotiations-­‐
continuing/	  
101	  Turkey	  has	  indeed	  a	  series	  of	  cases	  in	  front	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Right	  in	  Strasbourg.	  One	  of	  the	  
most	   symbolic	   cases	   is	   the	   2009	   Abdolkhani	   and	   Karimnia	   v.	   Turkey	   (Application	   no.	   30471/08)	   that	  
condemned	   Turkey	   for	   breaching	   the	   European	   Human	   Rights	   Convention	   (EHRC)	   for	   willing	   to	   return	   two	  
Iranian	   refugees	   (who	   had	   been	   granted	   this	   status	   by	   UNHCR	   during	   their	   stay	   in	   Iraq)	   back	   to	   Iran,	  
contravening	  therefore	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulement.	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negotiations	   to	   the	   end	   at	   the	   level	   of	   Chief	   Negotiators’.102	   The	   re-­‐launching	   of	   the	  
negotiations	   in	   January	   2011	   took	   place	   under	   the	   European	   Commission	   leadership	   that	  
managed	  to	  overcome	  resistance	  from	  Germany	  and	  France	  to	  open	  up	  a	  visa	  liberalization	  
dialogue.103	  Endorsing	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  approach,	  Burgin	  argues	  that	   ‘the	  political	  gain	  of	  the	  
Commissions’	  offer	  to	  consider	  visa	  exemption	  for	  Turks	  outweighed	  the	  financial	  and	  social	  
costs	   of	   readmitting	   irregular	   immigrants	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   credible	   EU	   membership	  
perspective’.	  104	  
	  
In	   June	   2012,	   visa	   liberalization	   talks	   started	   as	   part	   of	   a	   broad	   political	   re-­‐launch	   of	   the	  
negotiations	  for	  EU	  accession.	  The	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  Roadmap	  was	  offered	  to	  Turkey	  
highlight	   nonetheless	   the	   contradictions	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   credibility	   of	   this	   incentive.	  
According	   to	   interviews,	   ‘Turkey’s’	  position	  was	   that	  we	  would	   initial	   the	  EURA	  only	  when	  
the	   mandate	   in	   the	   Council	   on	   VL	   would	   be	   secured’.105	   Following	   the	   reverse	   logic,	   EU	  
member	   states	   wanted	   first	   Turkey	   to	   sign	   the	   EURA	   and	   then	   to	   provide	   Turkey	   with	   a	  
roadmap.	   A	   visa	   liberalization	   roadmap	   is	   technically	   a	   European	   Commission	   document.	  
Member	  states	  are	  only	  officially	  consulted.	  Yet,	  the	  consultation	  became	  more	  of	  a	  political	  
negotiation	   in	   the	   Council	   and	   took	   longer	   than	   usual,	   lasting	   until	   November	   2012.106	  
Transmitted	  to	  Turkey,	  the	  roadmap	  is	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  under	  consideration	  by	  Ankara.	  
This	   created	  a	   ‘real	  problem	  of	   trust	   (though	  not	  with	   the	  Commission’,107	  with	  a	   concern	  
that	   visa	   liberalisation	  would	  never	  happen.	  Prior	   experience	   from	   the	  Balkans	  has	   shown	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  European	  Commission,	  (2012),	  Ibid.	  
103	   Burgin,	   A.	   (2012).	   European	   Commission's	   agency	   meets	   Ankara's	   agenda:	   why	   Turkey	   is	   ready	   for	   a	  
readmission	  agreement.	  Journal	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  p.884.	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  Burgin,	  A.	  (2012),	  Ibid,	  p.884	  
105	  Interviewee	  H	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  Interviewee	  B	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  Interview	  H	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that	  once	  the	  roadmap	  negotiations	  started,	   ‘it	   is	  highly	   likely	  that	   it	  will	  be	  completed’.108	  
This	  was	   the	   case	  with	   five	  Western	  Balkans	   that	   opened	  negotiations	  with	   a	   roadmap	   in	  
2000,	   leading	   to	   visa	   liberalization	   three	   years	   later.109	   Yet,	   it	   seems	   that	   Turkey	   feels	  
different	   from	   other	   candidate	   countries,	   rightly	   so	   for	   having	   been	   discriminated	   in	   the	  
past.	  
	  
The	  roadmap	  specifies	  that	  ‘progress	  in	  the	  visa	  liberalization	  process	  should	  be	  founded	  on	  
the	   performance	   based	   approach	   and	   conditioned	   on	   effective	   and	   consistent	  
implementation	  by	  Turkey	  of	  those	  requirements	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States’.	  110	  
The	  main	  elements	  include	  mobility	  of	  bona	  fide	  travellers;	   improving	  border	  management	  
especially	  on	  the	  Greek-­‐Turkish	  and	  Bulgarian-­‐Turkish	  borders	  and	  with	  Frontex	  and	  Europol;	  
improving	  migration	  management	  through	  cooperation	  with	  EU	  immigration	  liaison	  officers,	  
information	  on	  countries	  of	  origin	  concerning	  illegal	  migration,	  promoting	  joint	  return	  flights	  
and	  raising	  awareness	  about	  the	  risk	  of	  illegal	  migration	  in	  public	  information	  campaign;	  the	  
provision	  of	  assistance	  and	  protection	  to	  asylum-­‐seekers;	  the	  fight	  against	  terrorism	  and	  the	  
fight	  against	  Transnational	  organised-­‐crime.	  The	  Roadmap	   identifies	   several	   legislative	  and	  
administrative	  reforms	  that	  Turkey	  needs	  to	  embark	  upon	  in	  order	  to	  ‘establishing	  a	  secure	  
environment	   for	   visa	   free	   travel’.	   These	   areas	   include	   document	   security,	   migration	   and	  
border	  management,	  public	  order	  and	  security,	  as	  well	  as	  fundamental	  rights.111	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Like	   for	   the	  Kosovo	   roadmap,	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘reinforced	  consultation’	   indicates	  a	   stronger	  
involvement	  of	  the	  Council	  in	  the	  process.112	  This	  confirms	  the	  high-­‐level	  political	  nature	  of	  
the	   roadmap.	   The	   Commission	   needs	   to	   take	   ‘into	   utmost	   consideration	   the	   political	  
discussions	  in	  the	  Council’.113	  	  Like	  Kosovo,	  but	  unlike	  the	  Western	  Balkan	  countries,	  it	  is	  also	  
expected	  that	  progress	  will	  be	  benchmarked	  against	  performance	  indicators,	  which	  include	  
‘Commission’s	   assessments	   of	   the	   expected	   migratory	   and	   security	   impacts	   of	   the	  
liberalisation	  of	  the	  visa	  regime	  with	  Turkey’.114	  	  
	  
EU	  member	  states’	  different	  views	  on	  Turkish	  accession	  have	  also	  weakened	  the	  credibility	  
incentive.	   In	  2012,	  during	  discussions	   in	   the	  Working	  Party	   for	  Enlargement	  and	  Countries	  
Negotiating	  Accession	  to	  the	  EU,	  France	  ‘maintain[ed]	  a	  reserve’	  and	  argued	  that	  ‘preventing	  
illegal	   immigration	   from	   third	   countries	   through	   Turkey	   would	   require	   an	   alignment	   of	  
Turkish	   policy	   with	   the	   EU	   visa	   policy	   regarding	   these	   countries’.	   This	   was	   opposed	   by	   ‘a	  
number	  of	  other	  delegations’	  that	  thought	  it	  could	  only	  be	  asked	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  visa	  
liberalization.115	  Divergent	  EU	  Member	  States	  positions	  contribute	  to	  perpetuate	  distrust	  in	  
the	  negotiations.	  	  
	  
The	  lack	  of	  clarity,	  especially	  from	  EU	  Member	  States,	  has	  weakened	  the	  power	  of	  the	  visa	  
liberalization	  dialogue,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  roadmap,	  as	  a	  powerful	  EU	  incentive.	  Turkey	  is	  now	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hesitant	   in	   signing	   the	   EURA	   before	   getting	   satisfaction	   on	   the	   EURA.	   H1	   is	   therefore	  
confirmed	  but	  needs	  to	  be	  analysed	  in	  the	  conjunction	  with	  domestic	  and	  regional	  factors.	  
	  
4.2.	  Domestic	  and	  Regional	  Political	  dynamics	  	  
	  
If	  Turkish	  migrant	  legislation	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  ‘conservative’,	  its	  visa	  policy	  towards	  Middle	  
East	   and	  Caucasus	  neighbours	   is	   rather	   liberal.	   In	   2009,	   visa	   requirements	  were	   abolished	  
mutually	  with	  Syria,	  Albania,	  Libya,	  Jordan,	  Tajikistan,	  Azerbaijan,	  Lebanon	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  
leading	  to	  the	  ‘construction	  of	  a	  new	  Schengen	  area	  in	  the	  Middle	  East’.116	   It	   is	  also	  in	  line	  
with	   the	   Turkish	   ‘zero	   problem’	   foreign	   policy	   adopted	   by	   Erdogan	   to	   re-­‐establish	   Turkish	  
regional	   leadership.	  EU	   requirements	   in	   the	   roadmap	  are	  putting	  at	   risk	   this	   liberal	  model	  
while	   requiring	   Turkey	   to	   embrace	   Schengen,	   a	   model	   that	   it	   has	   been	   criticizing	   for	  
discriminating	  against	  Turkish	  citizens.	  Turkey	  has	  also	  agreed	  in	  2009	  to	  visa-­‐free	  travel	  with	  
Russia	   and	   Iran,	   enabling	   for	   the	   latter	   ‘large	   numbers	   of	   regime	   opponents	   to	   flee	   the	  
country	  and	  enjoy	  temporary	  protection	  in	  Turkey	  before	  settling	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  West’.117	  
Reforming	  Turkish	  visa	  policy	  would	  be	  an	  economic	  challenge	  but	  could	  also	  undermine	  its	  
regional	  position,	  which	  would	  suffer	  from	  EU	  requirements	  on	  visa,	  and	  ‘would	  not	  be	  good	  
for	  business’.118	  	  
	  
Turkey,	  fearing	  to	  have	  to	  readmit	  non-­‐Turkish	  nationals,	  has	  adopted	  a	  ‘delaying	  tactic’	  vis-­‐
à-­‐vis	  the	  EU	  by	  securing	  readmission	  obligations	  from	  other	  countries	  before	  agreeing	  on	  an	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EURA.119	   This	   regional	   readmission	   policy	   is	   viewed	   as	   ‘a	   solution	   to	   this	   problem	   while	  
distributing	  the	  responsibility	  for	  transit	  migration	  over	  the	  region,	  and	  creating	  a	  scope	  for	  
return	   and	   readmission	   to	   countries	   of	   origin’.120	   Hence	   the	   liberal	   visa-­‐free	   policy	   is	  
matched	  by	   the	   same	   conditionality	   than	   the	   EU	   is	   applying	   to	   Turkey	   through	   the	   EURA.	  
Turkey	  has	  signed	  formal	  readmission	  agreements	  with	  Greece	  (2002),	  Syria	  (2003),	  Romania	  
(2004)	   Kyrgyzstan	   (2004),	   Ukraine	   (2005),	   Russia	   (2011)	   and	   negotiations	   have	   been	  
completed	   with	   Pakistan	   (2011).	   Discussions	   are	   on-­‐going	   with	   Azerbaijan,	   Bangladesh,	  
Belarus,	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   FYROM,	   Georgia,	   Lebanon,	   Libya,	   Moldova,	   and	  
Uzbekistan.121	  	  
	  
A	   Council	   document	   analysing	   the	  bilateral	   practice	   of	   readmission	  with	   Turkey	   concludes	  
that	   in	   spite	  of	   the	  absence	   for	   ‘nearly	  all’	   EU	  member	   states	  of	  any	  bilateral	   readmission	  
agreement	  with	  Turkey,	  paradoxically	  ‘nearly	  all	  responding	  delegations	  are	  however	  able	  to	  
carry	   out	   returns	   to	   Turkey’	   for	   Turkish	   nationals	   only.	  Only	   Romania,	  Greece	   and	   the	  UK	  
have	   readmission	   arrangements	   with	   Turkey.	   In	   2010,	   Greece	   returned	   almost	   100.000	  
Turkish	   nationals,	   followed	   by	   9.035	   returned	   by	   Germany	   and	   only	   2.500	   by	   the	  
Netherlands.	   Regarding	   the	   return	   of	   non-­‐Turkish	   nationals,	   the	  UK	   is	   the	   only	   country	   to	  
admit	   this	   possibility	   while	   for	   instance	   ‘Norway	   added	   that	   transits	   of	   third	   country	  
nationals	  in	  Turkey	  are	  not	  al	  lowed	  even	  if	  the	  returnees	  are	  escorted	  by	  police’.	  	  
The	   Turkish	   Ministries	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   EU	   Affairs	   have	   been	   coordinating	   EURA	  
negotiations.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   Interior	   was	   involved	   only	   from	   an	   expert	   perspective,	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accordingly	  because	   there	   is	   less	   trust	  of	   the	  AKP	   into	   the	  Ministry	  of	   Interior.122	  Opinions	  
towards	   what	   should	   be	   done	   diverge	   within	   the	   Turkish	   government.	   Some	   officials	  
consider	  that	  reforms	  such	  as	  the	  one	  on	  asylum	  law	  are	   in	   fact	  useful	   to	  advance	  Turkish	  
legislation	   and	   to	   comply	   with	   international	   normative	   requirements.	   While	   the	   political	  
system	  is	  also	  highly	  centralized	  with	  the	  final	  authority	  in	  signing	  the	  EURA	  residing	  in	  the	  
Prime	  Ministers’	  decision,	  interviews	  revealed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  diversity	  of	  views.	  This	  
has	  to	  do	  more	  generally	  with	  the	  diversity	  of	  views	  regarding	  Turkish	  accession.	  	  
	  
Turkish	  migration	  and	  asylum	  stakeholders	  usually	  put	  forward	  3	  main	  critical	  arguments:123	  
(i)	  the	  costs	  of	  change,	  (ii)	  the	  unfairness	  towards	  Turkey,	  and	  this	  is	  often	  the	  case	  with	  the	  
discourse	   on	   ‘equal	   treatment’	   and	   (iii)	   the	   faultiness	   of	   certain	   EU	  migration	   policy,	   and	  
some	   ‘hypocrisy’	   on	   the	   Schengen	   visa	   policy.	   Distrust	   is	   also	   an	   official	   argument,	   the	  
Turkish	  ambassador	  asking	  whether	  Turkey	  can	  really	  trust	  the	  Council	  in	  granting	  a	  visa-­‐free	  
regime	   to	   the	   EU.	   Yet	   other	   research	   shows	   that	   Turkish	   NGO	   and	   elite	   levels	   frequently	  
refer	   to	   European	   norms	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   freedoms	   to	   support	   asylum	   and	  
migration	   reforms	   in	   Turkey.124	   High-­‐ranking	   officials	   and	   bureaucrats	   ‘tend	   to	   appreciate	  
the	   fact	   that,	   in	   the	   EU,	   there	   is	   an	   existing	   official	   framework,	   a	   clear	   and	   intentional	  
immigration	   policy	   and	   allocated	   means	   that	   allows	   for	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   and	  
consistent	  state	  policy	  towards	  migration’.125	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Therefore,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  in	  practice	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  ‘Europeanization’	  of	  Turkish	  
JHA	   domestic	   legislation.	   On	   border	   management,	   if	   initially,	   Turkey	   said	   it	   found	   it	   too	  
costly	   to	   agree	   to	   an	   EURA	   and	   to	   reaccept	   also	   non-­‐Turkish	   national,	   it	   has	   been	  
cooperating	  intensively	  with	  Frontex	  to	  reduce	  those	  numbers.	  The	  Greece-­‐Turkish	  border	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  main	  points	  of	  entry	  for	  irregular	  migrant,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  “hot	  spots	  of	  irregular	  
migration”	   especially	   on	   the	   Evros	   river.	   Turkish	   borders	   need	   to	   be	   policed	   over	   around	  
3000	   km	   of	   land	   border	   and	   6500	   km	   of	   sea	   borders	   together	   with	   migration	   source	  
countries	   such	   as	   Syria,	   Iraq,	   Iran,	   notwithstanding	   Kurdistan.126	   Several	   security	   actors	  
police	   the	   border.	   If	   the	   General	   Directorate	   of	   Security	   is	   in	   charge	   of	   border	   control	   of	  
people,	   the	  Gendarmerie	   is	   in	   charge	  of	   the	   Iran	  and	   Iraq	  borders,	   the	  Land	  Forces	  of	   the	  
rest	  of	  the	  land	  borders	  and	  the	  Coast	  Guards	  of	  sea	  borders.127	  
	  
The	  detections	  at	  the	  border	  crossing	  between	  Greece	  in	  Turkey	  have	  declined	  significantly	  
since	   2010.128	   Frontex	   conducted	   several	   of	   operations	   on	   the	   Turkish/Greek	   border	  
including	  the	  Poseidon	  Joint	  Operation	  at	  the	  sea	  border	  but	  also	  land	  operations	  to	  identify	  
irregular	  border	  crossings.	  Several	   cases	  have	   revealed	   that	  migrants	  were	  also	  using	   lorry	  
transports	   to	   enter	   the	   EU,	   for	   instance	   from	   Turkey	   to	   Slovakia	   or	   to	   Bulgaria	   and	  
Romania.129	  The	  Eastern	  migratory	  route	  is	  also	  used	  for	  smuggling	  of	  cigarettes	  and	  for	  all	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sorts	   of	   organized-­‐crime	   activities	   such	   human	   being	   trafficking	   and	   smuggling	   of	  Middle	  
East	  migrants	  into	  Europe130	  and	  the	  smuggling	  of	  Iraqi	  and	  Kurdish	  migrants.131	  
	  
Political	   difficulties	   between	   Greece	   in	   Turkey	   have	   traditionally	   hampered	   an	   effective	  
readmission	  policy	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  Recently	  though	  the	  readmission	  agreement	  
signed	  between	  Greece	  and	  Turkey	  in	  2001	  was	  implemented	  in	  2010.132	  This	  relatively	  good	  
working	   cooperation	   at	   the	   operational	   level,	   combined	   to	   a	   Syrian	   refugee	   crisis	   and	  
changing	   migratory	   fluxes	   highlights	   a	   gap	   between	   Turkish	   official	   position	   of	   ‘hard	  
bargainer’	  and	  the	  practice.	  
	  
Finally,	  changes	  in	  Turkish	  migration	  and	  asylum	  law,	  requested	  in	  the	  roadmap,	  are	  not	  only	  
linked	   to	   the	   EU	   incentive	   of	   visa	   liberalization	   but	   also	   to	   fluctuating	   regional	   migratory	  
routes.	   For	   a	   long	   time	   Turkey	   cooperation	   with	   European	   countries	   was	   driven	   by	   the	  
presence	   of	   important	   diasporas	   in	   Germany	   and	   the	   conclusion	   of	   guest	   workers	  
programmes	  in	  the	  60s	  on	  labour	  migration	  but	  also	  with	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Holland,	  France,	  
as	   well	   as	   Sweden133	   were	   framed	   in	   a	   ‘emigration’	   narrative.	   In	   the	   70s,	   some	   Turkish	  
refugees	   came	   to	   Europe	   to	   flee	   the	   military	   regime.	   Nowadays,	   in	   Turkey,	   the	   Kurdish	  
minority	   mainly	   lodges	   asylum	   applications.134	   With	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan,	   Turkey	   has	  
become	  a	  key	  transit	  country	  for	  Afghan	  migrants,	  but	  also	  from	  Iraq,	  Iran	  or	  Pakistan.	  The	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   Europol	   (2013).	   Successful	   action	   against	   people	   smuggling	   and	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   2013,	  
available	   at	   https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/successful-­‐action-­‐against-­‐people-­‐smuggling-­‐illegal-­‐
immigration	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   (2012).	   Iraqi	   people	   smuggling	   network	   dismantled.	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   2012,	   available	   at	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   Strick,	   T.	   (2013).	  Migration	   and	   asylum:	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   tensions	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   on	  
Migration,	  Refugees	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  Displaced	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  Report	  to	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  Assembly	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  Council	  of	  Europe,	  No	  
13106	  |	  23	  January	  2013.	  
133	   Kirişçi,	   K	   (2007).	   Turkey:	  A	  Country	  of	   Transition	   from	  Emigration	   to	   Immigration,	  Mediterranean	  Politics,	  
12(1),	  91-­‐97.	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  Kirişçi,	  K	  (2007),	  Ibid,	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current	   Syrian	   crisis	   is	   certainly	   impacting	   Turkish’s	   strategy	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   EU.	   Since	   the	  
beginning	   of	   the	   Syrian,	   around	   the	   150000	   refugees	   have	   found	   shelter	   in	   Turkey,	  while	  
70,000	   Syrians	   are	   estimated	   to	   be	   leaving	   in	   urban	   area.	   UNHCR	   estimates	   that	   in	   2013	  
there	  will	  be	  a	  need	  for	  around	  500,000	  refugees	  from	  Syria	  in	  Turkey.135	  	  
	  
Interim	  conclusion	  
At	   the	   time	  of	  writing	   though	  Hypothesis	  1	   is	   confirmed	   since	   the	  EURA	  has	  not	   yet	  been	  
signed,	   Turkish	   officials	   distrusting	   EU	   Member	   States	   to	   ever	   grant	   Turkey	   a	   visa-­‐free	  
regime.	  Like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Morocco	  Hypotheses	  2,	  3	  and	  4	  are	  interrelated.	  If	  the	  number	  of	  
domestic	   veto	   players	   (H2)	   is	   not	   relevant,	   regional	   costs	   and	   perception	   of	   Turkey	   by	  
regional	   partners	   matter	   (H3).	   Finally,	   the	   official	   position	   of	   ‘hard	   bargainer’	   in	   EURA	   is	  
challenged	   by	   the	   discourse-­‐practice	   gap	   identified	   and	  migration	   practices	  which	   tend	   to	  
invalidate	  the	  inappropriateness	  of	  EU	  demands’	  thesis	  (H4	  is	  disconfirmed).	  
	  
Conclusions	  
The	  study	  of	  Morocco	  and	  Turkey	   in	  EURA	  negotiations	  reveals	  that	  beyond	  EU	  incentives,	  
broader	  domestic	  and	  regional	  political	  dynamics	  are	  key	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  EU	  
migration	   instrumentation.	   There	   is	   also	   a	   need	   to	   differentiate	   between	   an	   official	  
discourse	   of	   ‘hard	   bargainers’	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   readmission,	   which	   reveals	   that	   EURA	  
negotiations	   have	   structured	  Morocco’s	   and	   Turkey’s	  migration	   cooperation	   with	   the	   EU.	  
Our	   most	   dissimilar	   system	   research	   design	   evidences	   that	   beyond	   the	   relevance	   of	   EU	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   Available	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incentives,	   the	   differential	   empowerment	   of	   domestic	   veto	   players	   combined	   to	   regional	  
factors	  are	  key	  to	  explain	  what	  drives	  third	  countries’	  preferences	  and	  negotiations	  strategy	  
on	   the	   EURA.	   The	   appropriateness	   of	   EU	  policies	   in	   the	   eye	   of	   third	   countries	   is	   however	  
tactically	  played	  out	  in	  official	  discourse,	  but	  does	  not	  hold	  as	  a	  strong	  factor	  in	  practice.	  	  
	  
Linking	  back	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  EU	  migration	  policy	  instruments,	  this	  article	  corroborates	  that	  
EURA	   are	   not	   functional	   instrument	   set	   in	   stone,	   which	   respond	   to	   EU’s	  migration	   policy	  
rational	  needs.	  Rather,	   further	  research	  might	   look	   into	  how	  EU	  migration	   instruments	  are	  
being	   structured	   by	   a	   complex	   process	   of	   politicization	   and	   (de)	   politicization	   dynamics,	  
involving	  not	  only	  EU	  actors	  but	  also	  third	  countries.	  Politicization	  dynamics	  include	  EU	  turf	  
wars	  between	  the	  Commission	  and	  EU	  member	  states.	  Reluctance	  from	  EU	  governments	  to	  
lift	  up	  visa	  requirements	  for	  Turkish	  citizens	  is	  indeed	  driven	  by	  electoral	  concerns	  and	  a	  fear	  
that	  asylum-­‐seekers	  application	  would	  increase.136	  Yet,	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  the	  EU	  was	  
able	  to	  suspend	  visa-­‐free	  regime.	  In	  April	  2013,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  has	  indeed	  given	  its	  
approval	  to	  provisionally	  suspend	  visa-­‐free	  regime	  for	  countries	   like	  Serbia	  and	  Macedonia	  
that	   are	   thought	   to	   abuse	   the	   asylum	   application	   system	   in	   Germany,	   the	   Netherlands,	  
France,	   Luxembourg	  and	  Belgium.	   137	  As	  explained	  by	  Sander	   Luijsterburg,	   from	  the	  Dutch	  
Permanent	   Representation,	   ‘readmission	   and	   return	   policy’	   are	   key	   to	   ‘help	   to	  win	   public	  
support	   for	   other	   parts	   of	   migration	   policy’.138	   The	   Commission	   strategy	   to	   de-­‐politicize	  
EURA	  negotiations	  by	  coupling	  it	  to	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  innovative	  approach	  such	  as	  
MP	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Morocco	  similarly	  cannot	  hide	  political	  turf	  wars	  over	  the	  implementation	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  A.	  (2012),	  Ibid.,	  p.	  104	  
137	   Agence	   Europe	   (2013).	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of	   the	  projects	  by	  EU	  member	  states	  who	  remain	   in	  control	  of	  migration	  cooperation	  with	  
Morocco.	  
	  
At	   domestic	   level,	   EURA	   negotiations	   have	   been	   the	   object	   of	   high-­‐level	   politicization	   by	  
Moroccan	  and	  Turkish	  officials	  who	  have	  refused	  to	  police	  EU’s	  borders.	  A	  close	  analysis	  of	  
domestic	   readmission	   and	   migration	   practices	   nonetheless	   highlights	   an	   important	  
discrepancy	  with	  this	  politicization.	  As	   if,	  on	  the	  ground,	  EU	  demands	  were	  the	  object	  of	  a	  
de-­‐politicization	  responding	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  migration	  fluxes.	  This	  politicization	  of	  EURAs	  has	  
also	  been	  motivated	  by	  the	  meanings	  and	  perception	   it	  carries	   for	  the	  regional	  position	  of	  
Morocco	  and	  Turkey.	  
	  
More	  generally,	  beyond	  the	  case	  of	  Turkey	  and	  Morocco,	  this	  analysis	  calls	  for	  a	  reflection	  
on	  EU	  migration	  policy	   instruments	  over	  time	  as	  complex	  political	  and	  cognitive	  processes.	  
As	  social	  and	  political	  institutions,	  they	  structure	  power	  relations	  both	  within	  the	  EU	  and	  in	  
relation	  to	  third	  countries.	  They	  do	  not	  always	  respond	  to	  the	  original	   intended	  effect	  and	  
can	   escape	   the	   objectives	   assigned	   to	   them.	   This	   is	   specifically	   reflected	   in	   most	   of	   our	  
interviews,	  which	  revealed	  an	  emerging	  debate	  on	  the	  very	  relevance	  of	  EURA	  as	  migration	  
policy	   instruments.	  While	   Commission	   officials	   raised	   the	   validity	   of	   third	   country	   clauses,	  
member	  states	  officials’	  views	   included	  withdrawing	  some	  of	   the	  EURA	  mandates	  given	  to	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Interview	  Coding	  A-­‐ confidential	  interview,	  DG	  Home	  official,	  22	  April	  2013,	  Brussels	  B-­‐ confidential	  interview,	  DG	  Enlargement	  official,	  22	  April	  2013,	  Brussels	  C-­‐ confidential	  interview,	  EEAS	  official,	  23	  April	  2013,	  Brussels	  D-­‐ confidential	  interview,	  NGO	  expert,	  22	  April	  2013,	  Brussels	  E-­‐ confidential	  interview,	  Moroccan	  officials,	  19	  July	  2013,	  Brussels	  F-­‐ confidential	  interview,	  Permanent	  Representation,	  23	  April,	  Brussels	  G-­‐ confidential	  interview,	  European	  Commission	  official,	  23	  April,	  Brussels	  H-­‐ interview	  with	  Selim	  Yenel,	  Turkish	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  22	  April,	  Brussels.	  
